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This paper analyzes the accuracy of the principal models used by U.S. insurance regulators to
predict insolvencies in the property-liability insurance industry and compares these models with a
relatively new solvency testing approach—cash flow simulation. Specifically, we compare the
risk-based capital (RBC) system introduced by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) in 1994, the FAST (Financial Analysis and Surveillance Tracking) audit
ratio system used by the NAIC, and a cash flow simulation model developed by the authors.  Both
the RBC and FAST systems are static, ratio-based approaches to solvency testing, whereas the
cash flow simulation model implements dynamic financial analysis.  Logistic regression analysis
is used to test the models for a large sample of solvent and insolvent property-liability insurers,
using data from the years 1990-1992 to predict insolvencies over three-year prediction horizons. 
We find that the FAST system dominates RBC as a static method for predicting insurer
insolvencies.  Further, we find the cash flow simulation variables add significant explanatory
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1State regulators were criticized for insufficient solvency monitoring and exercising regulatory
forbearance (see U.S. House of Representatives, 1990, U.S., General Accounting Office, 1991).  The
criticisms led to proposals for federal insurance solvency regulation.  Causes of the worsening insolvency
experience include unexpected growth in claim costs and interest rate volatility in the early and mid-1980s,
as well as moral hazard induced by risk-insensitive guaranty fund assessments (Cummins, Harrington, and
Niehaus, 1993, A.M. Best Company, 1990).
     
2For more information on the FAST system, see Klein (1995).  An older system, the Insurance Regulatory
Information System (IRIS), which tests insurer solvency based on twelve audit ratios, is also still in use by
the NAIC.  Although not all of the IRIS ratios appear in precisely the same form in the FAST system, FAST
can be considered a super-set that encompasses nearly all of the information conveyed by IRIS.  Hence, the




Increases in the frequency and severity of insurer insolvencies in the mid-1980s led to concern
about the adequacy of state insurance regulation and the accuracy of the methods used by regulators to
provide early warning of insurer insolvencies.
1 The National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC) responded by adopting a “solvency policing agenda” in 1989. The agenda resulted in a number
of changes in state solvency regulation, including the adoption of the Financial Analysis and Surveillance
Tracking (FAST) solvency monitoring system and risk-based capital (RBC) requirements for both life
and property-liability insurers.
2  FAST was implemented in 1993, and the property-liability insurance
RBC system went into effect in 1994.  
Well-designed solvency monitoring systems should identify a high proportion of troubled
companies early enough to permit regulators to take prompt corrective action and should minimize the
number of financially sound insurers identified as being troubled. Earlier research has called into question
the effectiveness of the NAIC’s RBC system in accomplishing these objectives. Grace, Harrington, and
Klein (1998) (GHK) find that although the ratio of actual capital to RBC is negatively and significantly     
3CHK also report that predictive power can be significantly improved by adding controls for insurer size
and organizational form.
     
4For further discussion of the cash flow simulation approach, see Casualty Actuarial Society (1996) and
Hodes, et al. (1996).

related to the probability of subsequent failure, relatively few companies that later failed had ratios of
actual capital to RBC within the NAIC’s ranges for regulatory action.  Cummins, Harrington, and Klein
(1995) (CHK) confirm that the predictive accuracy of the RBC ratio is very low, even when the
components of the ratio, rather than the overall ratio, are used as predictors.
3  
The only prior tests of the FAST system were performed by GHK (1995, 1998).  They tested the
overall FAST score, a univariate summary statistic compiled by the NAIC based on the approximately
31 financial ratios comprising the FAST system.  The NAIC assigns scores corresponding to a company’s
ratios based on a subjective evaluation of the importance of the ratios and their relationship to solvency,
and the scores are summed to obtain the company’s overall FAST score.  Financial strength is considered
to be inversely related to the overall FAST score. In their tests, the overall FAST score performs
considerably better than RBC in predicting insolvencies, and the addition of the RBC ratio to the FAST-
ratio prediction models leads to only modest improvements in predictive accuracy.  
A limitation of both the RBC and FAST systems is that they are based on a “snapshot” of the firm
at a given point in time, i.e., they are static rather than dynamic approaches to solvency testing (Cummins,
Harrington, and Niehaus, 1993, 1995). The more modern approach to solvency testing is dynamic
financial analysis (DFA), usually implemented using cash flow simulation.
4 DFA has the ability to
capture information not used in the static systems and thus to lead to more accurate solvency prediction.
For example, a cash flow model can take into account patterns of loss reserve runoffs and asset cash flows
and can incorporate external economic information such as yield curves and inflation rates. Thus, DFA     
5The modeling project was sponsored by the Alliance of American Insurers.  J. David Cummins and
Richard D. Phillips developed the model in collaboration with Douglas Hodes and Sholom Feldblum of
Liberty Mutual Insurance Group. Although cash flow simulation has not been used by the NAIC in solvency
testing, the cash flow simulation approach has been proposed as a regulatory system by industry groups and
implemented for solvency testing by the New York Insurance Department for certain life insurance products.
     
6GHK use data from each base year to forecast insolvencies over a three-year horizon, e.g., the 1989 data
were used to predict insolvencies occurring in 1990-1992.
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can provide information on a company’s ability to withstand potentially adverse economic developments
that cannot be captured by a static system.
The present paper extends the existing research on regulatory solvency prediction in two major
ways: The first major contribution is to test the accuracy of a DFA model in predicting insurer
insolvencies using a cash flow simulation model developed by the authors.
5  Variables based on cash flow
simulations are tested by themselves and in combination with the RBC and FAST scores to measure the
potential incremental power of DFA.
The second major contribution of the paper is motivated by a limitation of GHK’s analysis that
is likely to have produced an upward bias in their estimates of the predictive accuracy of the FAST
system.  The problem arises because the FAST scores used in their tests were optimized by the NAIC to
accurately predict the insolvencies that actually occurred in 1993, while also considering information on
insolvencies occurring in 1991 and 1992.  In addition, the NAIC changed ratios over their sample period
based on the characteristics of the insolvencies that occurred in each year, and GHK use the set of ratios
chosen by the NAIC in 1993.  Thus, the variables used in their tests incorporate information that would
not have been known in 1989, 1990, and 1991, the three base years for their solvency tests.
6   Although
the degree of bias is difficult to determine without further analysis, it seems clear that GHK did not
perform a true ex ante test of the FAST system’s predictive accuracy.  We perform an ex ante test of
FAST in this paper by measuring the predictive accuracy of the set of 19 FAST ratios that were used     
7All insurance insolvencies of any meaningful size are reported to the NAIC by the state insurance
commissioners.  
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consistently throughout our sample period.  We compare the predictive performance of the consistent
FAST ratios with the FAST variables used by  GHK (1995, 1998), i.e., the overall FAST score and the
full set of 31 ratios, both optimized by the NAIC for 1993.  Thus, our tests avoid any bias caused by the
1993 optimization problem and the NAIC’s tendency to change the ratios after the fact to increase
predictive accuracy.
An additional  contribution of our paper is to introduce to the insurance insolvency literature a
new approach to comparing the performance of the alternative solvency monitoring models—receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) analysis. ROC analysis has its roots in engineering (Petersen et al., 1954)
and is the generally accepted methodology for evaluating diagnostic performance of competing models
in such fields as psychometrics, medical imaging, and weather forecasting (Swets, 1996).  We use ROC
analysis in this paper to determine whether the cash flow variables add significantly to RBC’s and
FAST’s ability to predict the solvency of insurers. 
The sample of firms used in our analysis consists of all property-liability insurers that became
insolvent during the period 1991 through 1995 that were reported to the NAIC as well as a sample of
solvent property-liability insurers.
7  The predictions are conducted using financial statement data from
three years—1990, 1991, and 1992—with three-year prediction horizons.  
By way of preview, our results confirm the GHK (1995, 1998) and CHK (1995) finding that the
risk-based capital formula and its components are not very effective in predicting insolvencies.  We find
that predictive accuracy is significantly improved through the use of variables based on the FAST system.
As expected, the GHK (1995, 1998) FAST variables perform better than the set of FAST ratios used
consistently throughout the sample period.  The cash flow simulation results add significant incremental    
8"Accident year development" refers to the ratio of developed (i.e., estimate of ultimate) incurred
losses and allocated loss adjustment expenses evaluated at the current year to the initial evaluation of
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explanatory power to the RBC and FAST variables taken alone or in combination. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we describe the NAIC’s RBC and
FAST systems and our cash flow simulation model. Section 3 presents the methodology and discusses
our data base. The results are presented in section 4, and section 5 concludes.
2.  The Solvency Prediction Methods
The NAIC Property-Liability Risk-Based Capital System
The NAIC property-liability risk-based capital system consists of a series of ratios that are
multiplied by various balance-sheet and income statement variables to compute RBC “charges” for the
principal risks facing insurers. The sum of the charges, reduced by a covariance adjustment, equals the
insurer’s risk-based capital.  The insurer’s actual capital is divided by its risk-based capital to obtain the
RBC ratio, and regulatory action is prescribed for insurers whose RBC ratios fall below specified
thresholds (see below).
The RBC formula assesses charges for four major types of risks—asset risk, credit risk,
underwriting risk, and growth and other forms of off-balance-sheet risk (see NAIC, 1993, and Cummins,
Harrington, and Niehaus, 1995, for more details).  The provision for underwriting risk applies separate
risk factors to loss and loss adjustment expense reserves and to net premiums written for each line of
business. We refer to the resulting RBC charges as "loss reserve RBC" and "written premium RBC,"
respectively.   The loss reserve charges accounted for about 41 percent of total industry RBC in 1992,
while written premium RBC accounted for about 27 percent.  The loss reserve and written premium risk
factors are based on regulatory judgment and analysis of the industry's worst accident year development
and worst accident year loss ratio over the previous 10 years.
8 The factors are discounted to present valuethese incurred losses and allocated loss adjustment expenses. Positive development indicates that initial
estimates of ultimate losses were too low. "Accident year loss ratio" refers to the ratio of developed
incurred losses and allocated loss adjustment expenses to net premiums earned. Under "accident year"
reporting, all losses are assigned to the year in which the event occurred that triggered coverage (e.g.,
date of an accident). 
     
9For 1994, the RBC charge obtained from application of the covariance adjustment formula was
multiplied by 0.4 to calculate the benchmark RBC levels (the final formula result) reported in insurer annual
statements.  This scale factor was increased to 0.45 in 1995 and to 0.5 for years after 1995.

to reflect the fact that reserves are generally reported on a non-discounted basis.  Charges are based on
a weighted average of industry and company experience so that an insurer with worse than average loss
development and loss ratios will have risk factors higher than the industry factors.
Asset charges ("investment RBC") accounted for about 21 percent of the total property-liability
insurer RBC in 1992.  The bond and preferred stock (for non-affiliates) factors are based on NAIC
valuation categories, which generally parallel Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. The bond factors range
from 0 for Treasury bonds to 30 percent for bonds in or near default. They are adjusted upward
(downward) if the number of issuers reflected in its bond portfolio is less (more) than 1,300 to reflect the
diversification of credit risk across issuers (Klein, 1995).  There is a 15 percent charge for common stocks
of non-affiliated corporations.  An asset concentration factor increases the RBC charges for the 10 largest
asset exposures grouped by issuer. 
The credit component of the formula ("credit RBC") applies a 10 percent charge to reinsurance
recoverable from non-affiliates and affiliated alien insurers and smaller charges to various other
receivables.  Additional RBC charges are given to insurers with three-year average growth in gross
premiums written in excess of 10 percent and for off-balance-sheet liabilities. We refer to these two
components as "growth RBC."  In 1992, credit RBC accounted for 10 percent of total industry RBC and
growth RBC accounted for 1 percent of the total.  The sum of the RBC charges is reduced through a
covariance adjustment to reflect the effects of diversification across risk factors.
9
  The RBC system requires regulators to take specified actions if an insurer’s actual capital falls
below certain thresholds.  The "authorized control level" (ACL), which is equal to the final RBC formula
result, is used as the primary point of reference.  Other levels are calculated as percentages of the ACL:
(1) Company Action Level.  An insurer with capital below 200 percent of the ACL must file a plan
with the insurance commissioner that explains its financial condition and how it proposes to
correct its deficiency.
(2) Regulatory Action Level.  When an insurer's capital falls below 150 percent of the ACL, the
commissioner is required to examine the insurer and institute corrective action, if necessary.
  (3) Authorized Control Level.  If an insurer's capital falls below 100 percent of its ACL, the
commissioner has the legal grounds to rehabilitate or liquidate the company. 
(4) Mandatory Control Level.  If capital is less than 70 percent of the ACL, the insurance
commissioner is required to seize the company.
The accuracy of the RBC system is of great importance not only to avoid costs to the guaranty fund
system arising from insolvencies not identified in time to avoid large deficits but also to avoid imposing
unnecessary regulatory costs on financially sound insurers.
The FAST System
The NAIC’s financial analysis and surveillance tracking  (FAST) system and the older insurance
regulatory information system (IRIS) were designed to prioritize insurers for further regulatory action.
The IRIS system consists of 12 audit ratios with published ranges that are deemed acceptable by the
regulators.  The FAST system consists of approximately 30 ratios and corresponding scores for each ratio
(Klein, 1995).  The ultimate output from the FAST system is the overall FAST score equal to the sum
of the individual insurer’s audit ratios multiplied by the corresponding scores. Companies performing
poorly in terms of the IRIS and FAST test results are given a higher priority by regulators in deciding
upon subsequent regulatory attention.  
The FAST system was introduced in part as a result of the allegation that insurers were able to
“game” the IRIS system because it is based on only a few ratios, for which the regulatory action cutoffs
are specified in advance and rarely changed (Klein, 1995). In contrast to the IRIS system, the FAST
scores are not revealed by the NAIC, and both the ratios and the scores could change over time as new
information becomes available. Thus, the FAST system is expected to provide more accurate solvency
predictions than the IRIS system.  Even though not all of the IRIS ratios appear in the FAST system in
precisely the same form, nearly all of the relevant information captured by IRIS is also incorporated in
FAST, and FAST captures a significant amount of information not reflected in IRIS (Grace, Harrington,
and Klein, 1995).  Accordingly, in this paper we focus on the FAST system rather than the IRIS system.
Grace, Harrington, and Klein (1995) tested FAST against alternative specifications and with
additional scoring methods. After an exhaustive investigation, the authors concluded that changes in the
scoring methodology and other alternative specifications did not lead to better predictions than a logistic
regression model based solely on the FAST ratios and other firm characteristic variables (such as total
assets and a mutual versus stock dummy variable).  Thus, the authors concluded that there are diminishing
returns to examining additional audit ratios based on financial statement data and that other approaches
that add new types of information to solvency analysis, such as cash flow simulation, should be explored.
However, as mentioned above, their tests are subject to potential bias because the scores and ratios they
used were modified after the fact by the NAIC and thus contain information that would not have been
known in a true ex ante test of predictive accuracy.  Our methodology corrects this problem, as explained
below.
The Cash Flow Simulation Model
In contrast to the NAIC’s RBC and FAST systems, cash flow simulation is a dynamic approach
to solvency testing.  Rather than evaluating the financial health of an insurer using a snapshot of the
company’s financial condition at a point in time, the cash flow simulation approach projects the
company’s financial condition over a period of time under alternative economic scenarios.  This section
discusses the key components of the cash flow simulation model. 
General Principles.  Cash flow simulation is based on the fundamental principle of asset pricing
that the value of any asset is determined by its cash flows.  A pro-forma cash flow statement for the
property-liability insurance industry is shown in Table 1.  The principal cash inflows are premiums and
investment income, and the principal cash outflows are losses, expenses, and federal tax payments.  The
net cash flow reflects the industry’s net cash position for the year.  Our model uses the same basic cash
flows but is much more complex, incorporating separate cash flows for the major lines of insurance and
categories of assets.  
The starting point for the simulation is the company’s financial position at the end of a specified
year (1990, 1991, or 1992 in this study), as reflected in its balance sheet, income statement, and other
financial accounts. The cash inflows and outflows implied by the company’s beginning financial
condition are then simulated over a 20-year time horizon.  At the end of the 20-year projection period,
the present values of the company’s remaining cash flows are computed and added to its net resources
at the end of the period.  If the net resources are positive, the company is considered to have survived,
but if the net resources are zero or negative, it is considered to have become insolvent.  Companies are
classified as solvent or insolvent on the basis of this test.
The model used in this paper is intended as a practical tool for regulatory solvency testing rather
than a managerial decision-making model.  Because the regulator is primarily concerned with whether
the company’s current resources are adequate to pay its obligations, the model is designed as a runoff
model rather than a going concern model.  The objective of developing a simulation model that could
be used in practical regulatory solvency testing also drives other important characteristics of the model:
(1) The data used by the model are from the company’s regulatory annual statement, which can be read     
10The model is designed to run on a personal computer using the Microsoft Excel
® spreadsheet program
and can be run automatically with little or no operator intervention.  
     
11The scenario approach is also much easier to explain to non-technical users and thus would be more
likely than the stochastic approach to gain widespread acceptance among regulatory personnel.

into the program automatically from the computer diskettes filed by the insurers with the NAIC.
10 (2) The
model uses a non-stochastic, scenario-testing approach rather than stochastically simulating investment,
loss, and other important flows.  Seven scenarios are programmed into the model, which can be changed
by an advanced user.  The scenarios include a baseline scenario, where cash flows are based on expected
values, and six progressively more adverse scenarios, involving elements such as higher than expected
losses, adverse reserve development, and lower investment income.  The scenarios used in paper are
defined in Appendix A.
The reason for choosing a scenario testing rather than a stochastic approach is that accurate
stochastic modeling requires careful estimation of probability distributions, which are likely to vary by
company.  Such a detailed analysis would not be feasible in a regulatory context where approximately
2000 companies are to be analyzed within a few months’ time.
11  
To provide a robust test of the simulation model, we chose not to optimize the model to perform
well in predicting the insolvent firms in our sample.  The scenarios were designed a priori based on
actuarial and financial theory rather than through an analysis of financial statement data.  Thus, any
incremental predictive power provided by the cash flow model probably could be improved upon by
adopting a more aggressive modeling strategy.  
The  model contains separate modules for each of 18 lines of insurance as well as various
categories of investments and other insurer accounts.  The remainder of this section discussion provides
brief descriptions of the premium, loss, and investment modules.
The Premium and Underwriting Expense Module.  In keeping with the runoff approach, the     
12That is, the company is assumed to be solvent as of the date of the financial statements used to start the
simulation.  We assume that the company will be audited again 18 months following the starting date of the
simulation, because NAIC regulatory statements are filed annually (in March) and it takes the NAIC several
months to analyze the data.
     
13More precisely, define P1 and P2 to be premiums collected during simulation years 1 and 2, respectively,
and define mp as the five-year premium growth rate.  Then P1 = P0*mp and P2 = ½ (P0*mp
3/2), where P0 = the
company’s net earned premiums in the year prior to the start of the simulation. 

premium and underwriting expense cash flows are simulated on the assumption that the company does
not continue to write new business over most of the simulation period.  However, the company is
assumed to write new business for 18 months following the starting date of the simulation, reflecting the
amount of business that would be written prior to the next audit following the financial statement used
to begin the simulation.
12  New premium writings are projected as the company’s current premium
writings increased by a growth rate equal to the company’s average annual premium growth over the prior
five years.
13  
Underwriting expenses are assumed to be paid only while the company is collecting premiums,
i.e., during the first 18 months of the simulation. The expense payments are based on a weighted average
expense ratio, defined as follows: ER = 3I ERi wi, where ER = the weighted average expense ratio, ERi
= the company’s actual expense ratio for line I in the year prior to the start of the simulation, and wi = the
weight given to line I. Expenses in years 1 and 2 are then computed as: Ej = ER*Pj, j = 1, 2. The weight
given to each line of business is equal to the total reserve for the line of business relative to the company’s
total reserves.  
The Loss Modules.  The loss modules are used to generate the company’s loss cash flows from
each of 18 lines of insurance. The input data for the loss modules are taken from Schedule P of the
insurer’s regulatory annual statement, which provides information on the history of the company’s loss
reserves.  The loss cash flows are estimated by multiplying the company’s loss reserves as of the starting     
14The program gives more weight to the premium-based method in early development years and more
weight to the loss-based method in the later development years when the book of business is more mature
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date of the model by a sequence of loss cash flow factors projecting the amount of the loss reserve paid
out over each of the next 20 years. 
Two methods are used to estimate the loss payout proportions for each line of business—a
premium-based method and a loss-based method. The final payout proportions are based on a weighted
average of the factors generated by the two methods.
14  The premium-based method involves computing
the proportion of incremental paid losses relative to earned premiums.  Define Cy,d to be the cumulative
paid losses and allocated loss adjustment expenses for accident year y paid after d years of development.
Define Py to be the net earned premium for accident year y.  Define gy,d to be the proportion of accident
year y premiums paid out as losses during development year d.  Then the incremental payout proportions
under the premium-based method, gy,d, are equal to:
Once the gy,d's have been estimated, the model computes the average amount of the net earned premium
that is paid out as losses in each development year d over all the accident years. The payout proportion
for development year d is the average of the gy,d or  g￿,d, where
where N = the number of years of available data, and s = the final year for which data are available.
The loss-based method for estimating loss payout proportions computes the proportion of the
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ry,d ' Ry,d & Cy,d. (5)
Ly,d ' wd × g•, d × Py % (1 & wd)×l•, d × ry,d&1, (6)
Define Ry,d to be the total reported incurred losses and loss adjustment expenses for accident year y
reported at the end of development year d.  Define Ry,d to be the proportion of the age y+d reserve paid
during year d+1. Then, using the notation developed for the premium-based method, the incremental loss
payout proportions are equal to:
As with the premium-based method, once the Ry,ds have been estimated, the model computes the average
incremental loss payout proportion R@,d as follows:
The final loss-based payout proportions used in the model are equal to a weighted average of the
company’s and the industry’s loss-based payout proportions, and the final premium-based payout
proportions are obtained similarly.  The weighting factor in the model has been set equal to ½.  
The model uses the premium-based and loss-based payout proportions to simulate the loss cash
flows attributable to each accident year.  Define ry,d to be the amount of the reserve remaining to be paid
out as losses for accident year y at the beginning of year y+d, i.e., it is the amount of accident year y's
reserve left to be paid after d development years and is equal to
  
Define Ly,d to be the estimated loss cash flow from accident year y in development year d.  Then Ly,d is
equal to     
15As an element of conservatism, no credit for over-reserving is given when estimating the average adverse
development for the company or the industry.  The relevant adverse reserve development percentage(s) is
(are) set equal to 0 for the baseline scenario, and underreserving in the moderately and severely adverse
scenarios is reflected by increasing the company’s stated loss reserves by one and two standard deviations
of the reserve development factor.

The weight wd, 0 # wd # 1, is an industrywide estimate of the proportion of total losses unpaid by the end
of development year d. 
Property-liability insurers face the risk that ultimate loss payments will exceed current loss
reserves.  This type of risk, known as reserving risk, is incorporated into the model through the scenario
definitions. The baseline scenario assumes that a given company’s reserves are understated by a
percentage based on the company’s prior loss reserve development and the industry’s prior loss reserve
development, where loss development is defined as the ratio of the estimated losses incurred for a given
accident year as of the most recent reporting date to the estimated losses incurred as of the initial
reporting date for that accident year, minus 1.  The moderately and severely adverse scenarios assume that
the company's loss reserves have been understated by the weighted average adverse development factor
plus 1 and 2 loss development standard deviations, respectively.
15 
The model distinguishes between lines of business that pay nearly all of their losses in the first
three years of development (short-tail lines), the first 10 years of development (intermediate-tail lines),
and lines of business where significant payments still remain to be made after ten development years
(long-tail lines).  For short-tail (intermediate-tail) lines all losses not paid out by the end of the third
(10th) development year are assumed to be paid out in the fourth (11th) year and no further loss cash
flows are generated from these lines after the fourth (11th) development year. 
Long-tail lines of business continue to generate loss cash flows for the entire 20-year simulation
period.  The estimates of the future loss payments for the first 10 development years are generated as     
16Define Fy,d as the ratio of the prospective loss cash flow payment of accident year y in development year
d relative to the most recently reported total incurred losses and loss adjustment expenses for year y, i.e., 
 Fy,d = Ly,d/Ry, where Ry = the incurred losses and loss adjustment expenses for accident year y at most recent
report.  Fy,d is averaged over all accident years to obtain F.d and the inverse power curve is fitted to the first
10 observations on F.d using ordinary least squares.  The model is ln(F.d ) =   +   * ln(d), d = 1, 2, . . ., 10.
We then project the cash flow factors for years 11 through 20 using the estimated model, i.e.,
 =  e
a d
b, where a and b are the estimated values of   and  , respectively. ˆ Fd
     
17The lump sum payment at time 21 is given by the formula Ly,21 = ry,20*(1+dx), i.e., the remaining reserve
at time 20 is adversely developed for one additional year.
     
18Insurers report the value of bonds maturing in less than 1 year, greater than or equal to 1 year but less
than 5 years, greater than or equal to 5 years but less than 10 years, greater than or equal to 10 years but less

described above. However, because Schedule P contains only 10 years of loss development history,
starting with development year 11 the model estimates loss payments by fitting an inverse power curve
to the first 10 years of loss payments and then extrapolating the curve to determine the loss payments for
the next 10 years.
16  In development year 21, a lump sum payment is made to pay off any reserves that
may remain.
17  Once the model has estimated the loss cash flows for each line of business, the flows from
the individual lines are added to determine the total loss payments made by the company for each of the
next 20 years.  
The Investment Module.  The investment module starts with the company’s current asset
holdings and estimates the cash flows that will be generated from these investments over the 20-year
projection period. The starting value of the equity portfolio is equal to the market value of equities
reported in the company’s annual statement.  The annual statement gives data on the bonds held by
insurers categorized by quality (default risk) and maturity.  The bonds are treated by the model as cash
flow vectors, with the cash flows generated by any given bond equal to its coupon payments and projected
payment of principal, subject to adjustments for default risk and interest rate risk, discussed below.
Insurers report bond maturities in the NAIC regulatory annual statement in multi-year bands, and we
assume that bonds in a given maturity band mature uniformly over the years covered by the band.
18than 20 years, and in 20 or more years. The model treats bonds with maturities longer than 20 years as 20-
year bonds. One coupon payment and the face value of the 20-year or more bonds are assumed to be paid at
time  20.
     
19The baseline assumption for average capital gains is 7.09 percent per year, the moderately adverse
scenario assumes a capital loss of -12.9 percent in the first year of the simulation, and the severely adverse
scenario assumes a capital loss of -32.9 percent in the first year.  These assumptions are based on the long-
term average capital appreciation on large company stocks for the period 1926-1992 from Ibbotson
Associates (1993).  For purposes of comparison, our severely adverse capital loss is larger (in absolute value)
than all but two single year capital losses during the period 1926-1992 (1931 and 1937).   Our moderately
adverse capital loss assumption is larger than all but seven single year capital losses during the period 1926-
1992.  Thus, we believe that our adverse scenarios expose insurers to an appropriate degree of risk from stock
price declines.

CAPi ' Si&1 × CGi for i [1,20]. (7)
The model simulates stock price risk by accumulating the company’s initial stock holdings using
capital gains and dividend accumulation factors.  Define Si to be the market value of the equities held by
the firm, where i ranges from 0 (the starting year of the simulation) to 20.  Stock price risk is simulated
by varying the vectors of capital gains and dividends used to accumulate the value of the insurer’s stock
holdings over the projection period.  Define CAPi to be the amount of the capital gain for simulation year
i.  Define CGi to be the capital gain factor used to generate year i’s capital gains.  Then, the formula used
to determine the amount of capital gains for any year is
The baseline scenario assumes that all capital gains factors are equal to the long-term historical average
(1926-1992) capital gain factors reported by Ibbotson Associates (1993) for the large company stocks (the
Standard & Poor’s 500-Stock Composite Index). The moderately adverse and severely adverse scenarios
shock the equity portfolio of the firm by supposing the company suffers a large capital loss in the first
year, followed by average capital gains in subsequent years. The capital gains factors for the first year for
the moderately and severely adverse scenarios are equal to the average capital gains factor minus 1 and
2 standard deviations, respectively.
19  Other capital gains assumptions could be used to generate
alternative scenarios.
The design of the dividend factors is very similar to the capital gains factors.  However, dividends
are assumed to be received currently as investment income cash flows, whereas capital gains are held on
the books until the insurer needs to sell assets (see below).  The baseline scenario assumes the company’s
equity portfolio receives dividends equal to the long-term average dividend yield on large company stocks
for the period 1926-1992.  The moderately and severely adverse scenarios assume that the first year
dividend rate is one and two standard deviations below the average long-term dividend yield, respectively.
 The model incorporates bond default risk using the bond mortality loss tables presented in
Altman (1992).  The bond mortality loss rates measure the estimated proportion of total book value that
is lost because of default in each year of the simulation period.  The scheduled bond cash flows for each
payment year and quality class are proportionately reduced by the mortality charges.  The mortality
charges are higher for bonds in lower NAIC quality classes.  The same mortality rates are applied to both
corporate and state/municipal bonds. The baseline scenario assumes that the bond mortality charges are
equal to Altman’s average bond mortality rates for each bond quality class. The moderately and severely
adverse scenarios assume the bond mortality loss rates are equal to the Altman averages plus 1 and 2
standard deviations, respectively, where the standard deviations are computed using data in Altman
(1992).
In addition to the risk of bond default, insurers are subject to fluctuations in bond market values
due to unexpected changes in interest rates.  The model’s bond cash flows consist of coupon and principal
payments.  If the insurer does not have to sell bonds, these cash flows will not be affected by fluctuations
in interest rates.  Accordingly, as a simplifying assumption, the model assumes that stocks are sold to
meet loss payments until the stock portfolio has been exhausted.  At that point, further uncovered loss
cash flows must be met by selling bonds.  To determine the proceeds from bond sales, the market values
of the bonds must be determined.  This is done by maturity and quality class using estimates of the market     
20The model is sufficiently general to allow for yield curves that are not flat and non-parallel yield curve
shifts.

ri, c, x ' rf % dc % si, x. (8)
yield rates for bonds in various quality and maturity classes (see Appendix A).  The bonds’ cash flows
are discounted using the estimated yield rates to obtain market values.  If the bonds must be sold, the sale
proceeds are equal to the estimated market values.
Interest rate risk is incorporated in the simulation scenarios by allowing for yield curve shifts.  The
default version of the model incorporates a flat yield curve, and adverse yield curve shifts reflect parallel
changes in the yield curve to a higher yield.
20  The effect of a yield curve shift is to alter the interest rate
at which bond cash flows are discounted to obtain bond market values.  Define rf to be the risk-free
interest rate at the beginning of the simulation, i.e., simulation year 0.  Define si,x to be the amount the
term-structure shifts in time period i relative to time 0 for interest rate scenario x, x   [1, 7].  Define dc
to be the default risk premium for bonds of quality class c, where c   [g, 1, ... , 6].  Finally, define ri,c,x to
be the yield to maturity for bonds of class c in simulation year i under scenario x.  Then ri,c,x is equal to
These yield to maturity rates are used to determine the market value of the bond through time.  
  Other Components of the Model.  In addition to the primary modules discussed above, the
model also recognizes risks from other insurer cash flows.  Like the NAIC’s RBC formula, the cash flow
model incorporates credit risk—the risk that the insurer will not be able to collect the full amount of
receivables owed by agents and reinsurers.  The model allows for the possibility that the agents and/or
the reinsurers will default on payments due the insurer, and the default charges are varied by scenario.
The default charges are applied against cash flows anticipated from agents and reinsurers in each
simulation period.  In addition to the usual balances due from agents, the model also incorporates a     
21Retrospective premiums, additional premiums owed to the insurer by policyholders under retrospectively
rated policies that adjust premiums after the coverage period has ended to reflect the policyholder’s actual
losses during the period, are usually subject to a maximum and minimum premium.

NCFi ' Pi % ACFi % RRCFi % DIVi % CPNi % MATi % SALEi & Li & EXi ± MSi (9)
module for accrued retrospective premiums.
21 Insurers with substantial amounts of retrospective business
may face significant risk that the retrospective charges will not be paid.  The model allows for this by
making charges against retrospective premium flows that are varied by scenario.
Net Cash Flow.  The net cash flow for simulation year i, NCFi, is the sum of the cash inflows and
outflows of the company.  The principal cash outflows are loss and expense payments. The principal cash
inflows consist of premiums and investment cash flows, including bond coupon payments and proceeds
from asset sales and maturities, payments received from agents and reinsurers, cash flows from accrued
retrospective premiums, and miscellaneous flows.  The net cash flow for simulation year i is equal to:
where Pi =  total premiums collected by the company for simulation year i,
ACFi = total agent’s balances and retrospective premiums collected during simulation year i,
RRCFi = total reinsurance recoverables collected during simulation year i,
DIVi = total dividends received by the company on its equity portfolio for simulation year i,
CPNi = total bond coupon payments received by the company in simulation year i,
MATi = total bond principal payments received by the company for simulation year i,
SALEi = proceeds from asset sales in year i, 
Li = total losses paid by the company for simulation year i 
EXi = total expenses paid by the company for simulation year i, and
MSi = miscellaneous cash flows for simulation year i.
Because asset sales are used to offset otherwise uncovered cash outflows, a negative net cash flow is     
22Consistent with the NAIC formula, the surplus variable we use here is the insurer’s "adjusted surplus,"
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almost always equivalent to insolvency.
3. Methodology and Data
The Logistic Regression Methodology
We compare the accuracy of the NAIC’s risk-based capital formula, the FAST system, and the
cash flow simulation model by estimating logistic regression models and use the results to compare the
predictive abilities of the various solvency assessment technologies. The logistic regression model takes
the following general form:
where RBCijt = risk-based capital variable i for insurer j in year t,
Sjt = the actual surplus of insurer j in year t,
22
Fijt = FAST variable i for insurer j in year t,
Cijt = cash flow variable i for insurer j in year t, 
Xijt = control variable i for insurer j in year t, and
jt = a random error term, assumed to follow a logistic distribution.
The dependent variable yjt
* is the propensity for the insurer to fail subsequent to year t. We do not observe
yjt
* but instead observe yjt = 1 if the insurer fails and yjt = 0 if it remains solvent. The model is estimated
using the method of maximum likelihood. Because the number of insolvent firms was not large enough
to use a holdout sample, we estimated the model using an approximate jackknife procedure as a control     
23The procedure uses a one-step approximation to the coefficient vector that would be obtained if the
observation were excluded from the sample (see Pregibon, 1981).

for within-sample prediction bias.
23
Specification of Independent Variables
With respect to the risk-based capital variables (the RBCijt in equation (10)), we follow CHK
(1995) in testing both total risk-based capital and its major components as possible predictors of insurer
insolvency.  The decomposition of the overall ratio leads to five variables—the ratio to actual surplus of
the risk-based capital charges for asset risk, credit risk, loss reserve risk, written premium risk, and
growth and other off-balance-sheet risk.  Using the ratios of the RBC components to surplus facilitates
the decomposition.
The specification of FAST variables is somewhat more problematical than the other variables
tested in our research.  We identify two problems with the use of the FAST results.  The first problem
causes a bias and the second causes multicollinearity.  
Recall that the FAST system is a series of financial ratios and accompanying scores for ratios
falling in various ranges.  Each company is given a score for each of its ratios depending on the ratio’s
value.  The scores are then summed to give the overall FAST score for the company.  Companies with
high overall FAST scores are given the highest priority for regulatory scrutiny.  The ratios are released
by the NAIC, but the scores are not publicly available to prevent insurers from gaming the system.
The first problem we encountered in testing the FAST system can be called “look-ahead bias” (see
GHK, 1998).  The look-ahead bias problem arises because the NAIC chooses ratios to include in the
system (the ratios vary somewhat by year) and assigns scores to the ratios so that the system performs
well in “predicting” observed insolvencies after the fact. Specifically, the NAIC scores and ratios
available for our study (and also for GHK, 1995, 1998) were chosen to give the highest scores to the     
24Note that it would  be appropriate to use the scores and ratios optimized to a given year’s insolvencies
in predicting insolvencies for subsequent years.  We could not conduct this type of prediction exercise
because the scores and ratios provided by the NAIC for use in this study were based on 1993.  GHK (1995,
1998) faced the same limitation.
     
25The ratios in the consistent set were known at the beginning of each projection period and were not
modified after the fact to improve predictive accuracy.   To some extent, limiting the analysis to this set of
ratios biases the tests against the accuracy of FAST to the extent that some form of the ex post ratios would
have been used prospectively in our base years.  Consequently, the actual accuracy of FAST falls somewhere
in between the accuracy of the consistent ratios and the accuracy of the full set of ratios, including the ex post
ratios.  However, it is likely that the true accuracy is closer to that of the consistent ratios because virtually
every important static aspect of an insurer’s financial condition is captured in the consistent ratios.
     
26Neither the individual ex post FAST scores nor the overall FAST score optimized for other years was
available in the data base provided to us by the NAIC.
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companies that actually failed during 1993, with consideration also given to the insolvencies occurring
in 1991 and 1992, i.e., the FAST scores and ratios were specified after the regulators observed the
outcome of the 1991-1993 experience.  As a result, the FAST variables available for this study are biased
toward accuracy in tests of insolvency prediction for years prior to 1994 because they incorporate
information not available ex ante in these years. Using this ex post information would not provide an
accurate comparison between the alternative solvency prediction models, since both the risk-based capital
and the cash flow simulation results are based solely on ex ante information.
24  
To correct for the bias in the reported FAST ratios and scores, we use as predictors the 19  FAST
ratios (not scores) common to the FAST system during the entire period under investigation.  (This is a
subset of the 31 ratios included in the 1993 FAST system.)  We refer to these ratios as the consistent
FAST ratios. Because the ratios in this set were not modified after the fact in light of observed insolvency
experience, this set of ratios does not suffer from the look-ahead bias problem.
25  For purposes of
comparison, we also predict insolvencies using the FAST ratios and the overall FAST score based on the
NAIC’s 1993 optimization of the system.
26 We refer to the 1993 ratios as the ex post FAST ratios.  The
FAST score and ex post FAST ratios are the same variables used by GHK (1995, 1998).  The 1993 FAST     
27We are comfortable using the ratios alone as Grace, Harrington, and Klein (1995) conclude that adding
the scores to the analysis does not significantly improve the logistic regression model based solely on the
FAST ratios and other firm characteristic variables.  
     
28The set of factors included in the final version of the logistic models is further reduced by eliminating
factors that were not statistically significant in earlier runs.  Factors were eliminated one at a time with the
least significant eliminated first.  







ratios (including the ex post ratios) are presented in Table 2, Panel B.
27  
The second methodological complication presented by the FAST ratios is that the number of ratios
is quite large and many are highly correlated with one another. Including all of the variables in our logistic
regressions would result in an unmanageable degree of multicollinearity, and including arbitrary
combinations of the variables is likely to understate the accuracy of the FAST ratios if the omitted ratios
convey information about insurer financial condition.  To solve this problem, we conduct a factor analysis
on the FAST ratios and use as variables those factors with eigenvalues greater than one.
28  We employ
a varimax rotation to orthogonalize the factors, eliminating the problem of multicollinearity among the
factors.
We test several variables based on the cash flow simulation model.  The most straightforward
variable is the ratio of predicted surplus at the end of the simulation period relative to the level of surplus
at the beginning of the simulation.  We expect this variable to be inversely related to insolvency. 
The second cash flow variable is the logarithm of the estimated time to failure. This is defined
as the actual time to failure for insurers predicted to fail by the model under the baseline scenario,
meaning that their simulated resources become negative, with claims still outstanding sometime prior to
or including simulation year 20.  For those companies having positive surplus after 20 years, we use a
hazard rate model to estimate the expected time to failure, as follows:     
29In this factor analysis we follow the same procedure outlined above for the FAST scores.  We employ
those factors with eigenvalues greater than or equal to one after a varimax rotation, and insignificant factors
have been eliminated from the models shown in the tables.
     
30Our definition of a small company is the same as that used by CHK (1995).  Specifically, the size
variable is set equal to 1 if a firm’s assets are less than $100 million.  This criterion was chosen judgmentally,
but our tests  revealed that it performs better than a continuous size variable equal to assets or the logarithm

  where E(t|t > 20) = the expected time to failure conditional on the insurer having survived to time
20,
h(t) = the density function of time to failure, and
H(t) = the distribution function of the time to failure.
The hazard rate model is estimated using a lognormal time-to-failure distribution with two exogenous
covariates: a size variable equal to the natural logarithm of the insurer’s assets and a mutual/stock
organizational form dummy variable. We expect the time to failure variable to be inversely related to the
probability of insolvency.
Both the simulated ending-to-beginning surplus ratio and the time to failure variable incorporate
information only from the baseline scenario.  To capture information conveyed by the other six more
adverse scenarios (see Appendix A, Table A.1), we conduct a factor analysis on the ratios of predicted
ending surplus to initial surplus and on the logarithm of the time to failure estimates under all seven
scenarios and use the significant factors as alternative independent variables to capture the outcome of
the cash flow simulations.
29  The 14 cash flow variables are highly collinear, but the use of factor analysis
enables us to reduce the set of information to that contained in only one or two factors, depending upon
the analysis year. 
Our principal control variables are those used by CHK (1995)—a size dummy variable set equal
to one for small companies and zero otherwise and an organizational form dummy variable set equal to
one for mutual insurers and to zero otherwise.
30 The motivation for the use of these variables is the CHKof assets.
     
31Other things being equal, claim costs tend to be more volatile for small firms. Small firms also might
have relatively lower franchise values and thus less incentive to reduce insolvency risk than large firms.
Mutual insurers may be less prone to moral hazard in the presence of guaranty funds.  They also tend to
specialize in the sale of less risky coverages than non-mutuals (see Lamm-Tennant and Starks, 1993).  
     
32The model produces a fitted value of yjt
*, yjt
f, for each firm.  Assume that we are interested in a Type II
error rate of z percent, i.e., an error rate such that z percent of the solvent firms are classified as insolvent.
We find the cutoff value of yjt
*, yjt
c, such that yjt
f > yjt
c for z percent of the solvent firms in the sample.  The
proportion of insolvent firms with yjt
f < yjt
c then equals the Type I error rate.
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finding that they significantly improve solvency prediction. In addition, earlier univariate analyses
provide evidence of higher insolvency rates for small firms and lower failure rates for mutual firms than
for non-mutual firms (e.g., A.M. Best Company, 1990).
31 
Model Evaluation
To compare the predictive accuracy of logistic models containing alternative sets of variables,
we employ three approaches.  Since logistic regression maximum likelihood techniques do not generate
standard measures of goodness of fit, we examine the pseudo R
2 (likelihood ratio index), the Type I/Type
II error tradeoff, and receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves.  The pseudo R
2 or likelihood ratio
index is equal to one minus the ratio of the estimated log likelihood function value relative to the value
of the likelihood function when the coefficients of the model are constrained to be zero (see Greene,
1990, p. 682).   The Type I error rate is defined as the probability that a firm that subsequently fails is
predicted to remain solvent, and the Type II error rate is the probability that a firm that remains solvent
is predicted to fail.   To evaluate the Type I/Type II error trade-off, we calculate the Type I error rates for
various levels of the Type II error rate.
32 Models with relatively low Type I error rates conditional on the
Type II error rate are deemed to be superior. 
Although ROC analysis is widely used in other disciplines, it does not appear to have a strong
presence in economics.  Accordingly, we provide a brief discussion of ROC analysis here and more
details in Appendix B.    
 The goal of ROC analysis is to provide a statistical test of whether a given model outperforms
an alternative model in a binary prediction exercise (i.e., in categorizing observations into two  mutually
exclusive groups) for various Type II error rates. ROC analysis is usually summarized graphically by
plotting an ROC curve in a two-dimensional plane where the Type II error rate is plotted along the X-axis
and the complement of the Type I error rate (1 minus the Type I error rate) is plotted along the Y-axis.
In our analysis, we assume that two alternative models, 1 and 2, will yield unique ROC curves, and the
parameters of the curves are estimated using the maximum likelihood technique developed by Metz,
Wang, and Kronman (1984).
A useful statistic that summarizes the accuracy of a particular model is the area below the ROC
curve. This statistic, known as the area index, is denoted Az, where the subscript represents the particular
model (i.e., 1 or 2) being summarized.  A model that perfectly discriminates between the insolvent and
solvent companies will have an area index equal to 1.0 and a model with no discriminatory power will
result in an area index of 0.50.  Using the results of the maximum likelihood estimation, we test the null
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where Ai = the area under ROC curve i,  i
2 is the standard error of Ai, i = 1, 2, and   is the correlation
coefficient between A1 and A2. The test statistic z is distributed as a standard normal variate, and the null
hypothesis is rejected for large values of z.     
33The insolvency data come from the NAIC Contact Person Reports.  The reports contain information
regarding single and multistate insolvencies brought to the attention of the NAIC by state regulators for 1990-
1995. The Reports contain information regarding the first public regulatory order involving a company. We
use this year of the first public order as the year of “failure.”  Any formal state regulatory order including
restrictions on management, conservation, rehabilitation, or liquidation was treated for the purposes of this
paper as a “failure.” Almost all companies having a formal regulatory order entered against them are
eventually liquidated. Two companies that were classified as “under rehabilitation” and were subsequently
successfully rehabilitated were removed from the sample. Several insolvent single-state companies were
eliminated from the sample because they did not file financial reports with the NAIC and thus do not appear
on the NAIC data tapes.  These companies were likely excused by a state from filing an annual statement
because they had few assets and/or liabilities, were undergoing liquidation, or were in the process of being
sold. A final constraint on the sample of failed companies is due to the way the NAIC determined the sample
of companies for which it would calculate risk-based capital.  Of the approximately 1,800 companies that
filed statements with the NAIC, the NAIC calculated RBC for approximately 1,200.  The excluded
companies  are typically small single-state companies or small companies with exotic organizational forms
such as Texas Lloyds or reciprocals.
     
34There is overlap between the three sample of insolvent insurers.  For example, companies becoming
insolvent during 1993 were included in all three base year analyses.
     
35The solvent firm sample size differs by year because of our sampling approach.  For each of the years
1990-1992, we chose a random sample of 300 solvent insurers that had meaningful data in the NAIC data

Study Design and Data
Our study design is very similar to that used by GHK (1995, 1998) and CHK (1995).  Specifically,
we predict failure rates over three-year prediction horizons using data from three base years, 1990, 1991,
and 1992. Thus, the 1990 data are used to predict insolvencies over the period 1991-1993, the 1991 data
are used to predict insolvencies for the period 1992-1994, and the 1992 data are used to predict
insolvencies for the period 1993-1995. Our sample of insolvent companies consists of all property-
liability insurers reported to the NAIC by state insurance regulators as becoming insolvent during the
period 1991-1995.
33  Our insolvent firm sample consists of  44 companies that became insolvent during
the 1991-1993 period, 48 during the 1992-1994 period, and 27 during the 1993-1995 period. These
insolvent companies were used in the analyses  from the 1990, 1991, and 1992 base years, respectively.
34
In addition to the insolvent companies, our sample also includes 244 solvent insurers for the 1990
analysis, 215 for the 1991 analysis, and 226 for the 1992 analysis.
35  Comparison of our sample of solventtapes, e.g., companies that did not have negative or zero values for surplus, assets, or premiums.  Some of
the 300 firms were dropped from the solvent firm sample in each year because they were missing data needed
as inputs for the cash flow simulation model and/or were missing RBC scores.  

firms with industrywide data reveals that our sample is representative of the industry.  
4.  Results
Summary Statistics and Univariate Results
Summary statistics for the solvent and insolvent insurers in the 1990 sample are presented in
Table 2. The table includes the variables employed in our analysis in Panel A as well as the individual
FAST ratios in Panel B. The results for the other two years are similar and hence are not shown.  Tests
of differences between means reveal that the solvent and insolvent insurers differ significantly across
several dimensions.  Insolvent insurers are significantly smaller than solvent insurers, are significantly
less likely to be mutuals, and have significantly higher ratios of risk-based capital to actual surplus.  The
ratio of predicted ending surplus from the cash flow model to initial surplus is significantly lower for
insolvent insurers than for solvent insurers, and the predicted failure year is significantly lower for
insolvent insurers than for solvent insurers.  The overall FAST score, most of the FAST and consistent
FAST factors, and both cash flow factors differ significantly between the two sets of firms.
The univariate prediction results based on the risk-based capital formula and the cash flow
simulation model are presented in Table 3.  For the RBC analysis, the Type I error rates represent the
percentages of insolvent companies with RBC ratios (ratios of actual surplus to RBC) greater than the
RBC ratio for the solvent companies that produces the specified Type II error rates.  For the cash flow
analysis, the results are reported by scenario, with the scenario results grouped by the stringency of the
loss reserving scenario definition.  Each scenario produces only one Type I-Type II error combination.
The RBC univariate results are consistent with those of CHK for 1990 and 1991, the two years
in which the present study and the CHK study overlap.  The Type I error rates for these years are quite
high for the lower Type II error rate levels.  For example, at a 10 percent Type II error rate, the Type I
error rates in 1990 are 70.5 percent and 54.76 percent, respectively.  Thus, at a Type II error rate that
might be considered reasonable by solvent insurers, the RBC formula fails to detect the majority of
insolvencies.  The RBC results are significantly better for the 1992 tests.  In this case the Type I error rate
for the 10 percent Type II level drops to around 30 percent.
The cash flow simulation model does better than the RBC formula with the Type II error rate
roughly in the 10 percent range for 1990 and 1991 but has a higher Type I error rate in 1992 than the RBC
formula (this comparison is based on scenarios 1 and 6).  With Type II error rates in the 20 percent range,
the cash flow model again performs better than RBC in 1990 and 1991 but performs  about the same in
1992.  Thus, the cash flow model is more accurate than RBC in 1990 and 1991, but the RBC formula
performs better in the 1992 tests. 
Logistic Regression Results
The estimation strategy in the logistic regression analysis is to start with separate models that
include risk-based capital variables, the overall FAST score, FAST factors estimated from the 1993
FAST ratios, FAST factors based on the ratios that were used consistently throughout the sample period,
and cash flow simulation variables.  We then analyze models that include combinations of variables from
the five sources. All models include the small company and mutual firm dummy variables.  Since the
results for many of the models are similar across all three years, we present the results based on the 1990
sample in the tables and note any significant differences between the 1990 results and those for 1991 and
1992.  The criteria for gauging the accuracy of models at this stage are the Type I - Type II error rate
tradeoffs and pseudo R
2 values, which indicate explanatory power.  We report the results of the ROC
analysis in the next section.     
36The model with the log of the predicted failure year as the cash flow variable performed almost as well
as the model using the cash flow factors. Although the predicted ending/current surplus variable was
statistically significant, the model containing this cash flow variable did not perform quite as well as the
other two cash flow-based models.
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The 1990 logistic models based on the solvency prediction methods considered separately are
presented in Table 4.  The best-performing cash flow model is shown in the table, i.e., the model based
on factor analysis of the results of all seven scenarios.
36 Not surprisingly, the models with look-ahead
bias, i.e., the models containing the overall FAST score and FAST factors based on the 1993 FAST ratios,
perform the best both in terms of the pseudo-R
2 and Type I - Type II error tradeoffs.  Among the models
that do not suffer from look-ahead bias, the model with the consistent FAST factors has the highest
pseudo-R
2, but the model with the cash flow factors generally has the best Type I - Type II error
performance.  The RBC models are the least accurate, confirming earlier findings that RBC does not have
much discriminatory power in predicting insolvencies.
The results presented in Tables 5 and 6 provide evidence on the predictive power of the RBC
system, the FAST system, and cash flow variables considered in combination with one another.  The
FAST variables considered in Table 5 are the overall FAST score and the factors based on the 1993 FAST
ratios.  Because the FAST variables in Table 5 all suffer from look-ahead bias, this provides a strong test
of the robustness of the RBC and cash flow results. 
Nearly all of the RBC variables in Table 5 are statistically insignificant.  Thus, RBC adds little
or no explanatory power to FAST.  In contrast, all of the cash flow variables in the Table 5 models are
statistically significant, and the models containing the cash flow variables generally have better Type I
-Type II error performance than the models containing FAST and  RBC variables but no cash flow
variables.  Thus, cash flow analysis adds information to the NAIC’s static solvency prediction systems,     
37The 1992 results are similar.  In 1991, the log of the predicted year to failure is statistically significant
and improves the Type I - Type II error tradeoffs.  However, the cash flow factors for 1991 are often
insignificant and produce only modest improvements in the Type I - Type II error tradeoffs.  
     
38The conclusions based on 1992 data are similar.  However, the cash flow variables do not perform quite
as well for 1991.
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even when these systems have been optimized based on ex post information.
37  Table 5 also reveals that
the FAST factors have better explanatory power than the overall FAST score, suggesting that predictive
power can be lost by averaging or summing variables that are not perfectly correlated. 
Table 6 is designed to provide evidence on the predictive power of RBC, FAST, and cash flow
variables when the look-ahead bias is not present.  The NAIC variables used in this table consist of RBC
and factors based on the consistent FAST ratios.  None of the RBC variables in Table 6 is statistically
significant, again confirming that RBC adds no predictive power to FAST.  All of the cash flow variables
are statistically significant, and the models that contain cash flow variables generally have superior Type
I -Type II error tradeoffs than models containing only the NAIC variables.  This provides further evidence
that cash flow analysis has the potential to add power to the NAIC’s solvency prediction models.
38 
ROC Results
In this section, we investigate the benefits of adding variables based on the cash flow simulation
model to models based on the NAIC’s solvency prediction systems by using the receiver operating
characteristics (ROC) methodology discussed earlier.  To do so, we jointly estimate the parameters of
ROC curves that pair each of several solvency prediction models based only on NAIC variables with
corresponding models of two types: (1) Models containing the NAIC variables plus two cash flow
simulation variables—the ratio of predicted ending-to-beginning surplus and the log of the predicted time
to failure, and (2) models containing the NAIC variables plus cash flow simulation factors. The models
that include the factors are expected to perform better because they capture information from the six non-
baseline scenarios. The area indexes are calculated for each model and tested to determine whether adding
the cash flow variables/factors significantly improves the prediction results.
   Tables 7 and 8 show the ROC results for the 1990-1992 samples. The results based on the cash
flow variables are shown in Table 7, and the results based on the cash flow factors are shown in Table
8.  The first column in each table defines the NAIC solvency models employed.  The first data column
(column (1)) shows the estimated area indices for the NAIC solvency models with the standard errors of
the area indices given in parentheses below.  Data column (2) displays the area indices and standard errors
for the models that contain the NAIC variables plus the cash flow variables.  Column (3), labeled
“Correlation A1, A2,” shows the estimated correlation between the area indices in columns (1) and (2).
Columns (4) and (5) show the results of the z-tests of the null hypothesis of equality between the area
indices in columns (1) and (2) and the one-sided p-value, respectively. Column (6) presents the
correlations between the area indices for the NAIC solvency models and for the models based on the
NAIC variables plus the cash flow factors, and columns (7) and (8) show the results of the z-tests
comparing the NAIC models to the cash flow factor models.
We focus first on the comparisons between the NAIC models and the models that add the cash
flow variables (Table 7). The majority of the z-tests for these comparisons (columns (4) and (5)) suggest
that adding the cash flow variables leads to a statistically significant increase in the explanatory power
of the NAIC models.  Of the 33 comparisons shown in this section of the table, 13 are significant at the
5 percent level or better, and 20 are significant at the 10 percent level or better.  The results are noticeably
better for 1990, where all comparisons show statistically significant gains from adding the cash flow
variables.  The majority of comparisons for 1991 and 1992 are not statistically significant, although the
cash flow variables add significant explanatory power to the majority of models that do not include the
FAST score, as opposed to FAST factors.  
The cash flow factors (Table 8) add significant explanatory power at the 5 percent level or better
in 14 of 33 comparisons and at the 10 percent level or better in 30 of 33 comparisons (see columns (7)
and (8)).  Thus, there are two overall conclusions from this analysis: (1) the cash flow analysis adds
significant explanatory power to models based on the NAIC regulatory variables, and (2) models that use
the cash flow factors perform better than those using the cash flow variables. The explanation for the
latter result is that the cash flow factors incorporate information from the six non-baseline scenarios,
whereas the cash flow variables represent only the baseline case.
Another way to view the results of the ROC analysis is to plot the ROC curves for competing
models.  Recall that the ROC curve is a plot of the probability of correct predictions of insolvent
companies, i.e., the complement of the Type I error rate (on the Y axis), against the probability of
incorrectly classifying solvent companies, i.e., the Type II error rate (along the X axis). Figure 1 displays
the estimated 1990 ROC curves for the models using the individual RBC components only, the model
containing both the individual RBC components plus the consistent FAST factors, and the model
containing the RBC components, the consistent FAST factors, and the two cash flow variables. The plot
shows that the model that performs with the least accuracy is the model containing only the individual
RBC components.  When the consistent FAST factors are added, the estimated ROC curve moves further
into the northeast corner of the graph, indicating that, for any given Type II error rate, this model
discriminates better than the model based only on the individual RBC components. The ROC curve
furthest into the northwest corner  adds the cash flow variables to the individual RBC components and
the consistent FAST factors. The curve based on the cash flow factors is somewhat better than that based
on the cash flow variables.  The ROC curves for the other years lead to similar conclusions and thus are
not shown.
5. Summary and Conclusions
This paper analyzes three methods of predicting insolvencies in the U.S. property-liability
insurance industry: the NAIC’s risk-based capital (RBC) system, the NAIC’s financial analysis and
surveillance tracking (FAST) system, and a cash flow simulation model developed by the authors. The
systems are tested individually and jointly to determine predictive performance.  
The prediction methodology is logistic regression analysis.  The dependent variable is equal to
1 if a company becomes insolvent and equal to zero otherwise.  The independent variables are drawn
from the three solvency prediction methodologies.  To test the RBC system, the ratio of the company’s
overall risk-based capital to its surplus and the ratios of the five principal risk-based capital components
to surplus are used alternatively as independent variables.  To test the FAST system, we consider the
NAIC’s overall FAST score and the FAST ratios, where both the scores and the ratios are optimized to
accurately predict the insolvencies that occurred in 1993.  To avoid the look-ahead bias inherent in the
1993 scores and ratios and hence to provide a true ex ante test of the FAST system, we also test the subset
of FAST ratios that were used consistently throughout our sample period.  For each variant of the FAST
ratios, we use factor analysis to compute orthogonal factors based on the ratios and use the resulting
factors as regressors.  To test the cash flow model, we use the ratio of predicted surplus at the end of a
20-year simulation period to actual surplus at the start of the simulation period and the predicted time to
failure, both from the baseline (expected value) simulation, as well as factors estimated from the same
two variables generated under all seven scenarios incorporated in the simulation model. 
The tests are conducted using data from 1990, 1991, and 1992 to predict insolvencies over three
year prediction horizons, 1991-1993, 1992-1994, and 1993-1995, respectively.   In conducting the tests,
we use all insolvent firms reported by the NAIC for which annual statement data are available as well as
a sample of more than 200 solvent firms for each base year.
The results support three principal conclusions: First, we confirm the findings of GHK (1995,
1998) and CHK (1995): that the risk-based capital ratio and its components provide very low explanatory
power in  predicting insurer insolvencies.  Second, we find that the FAST factors tend to dominate the
risk-based capital variables.  The explanatory power of the FAST models is considerably higher than that
of the RBC models, and the RBC variables tend to be insignificant when included in models jointly with
the FAST factors.  Thus, RBC appears to add no information to the FAST system. 
Third, the cash flow simulation variables add significant discriminatory power to the solvency
prediction models based on the RBC and FAST systems, even in the presence of look-ahead bias in the
FAST variables.  Thus, dynamic financial analysis appears to hold significant promise for providing
regulators with better predictions of insurer solvency.  This conclusion is particularly strong in view of
the fact that additional sophistication could easily be incorporated into the cash flow model, such as
upward sloping yield curves and non-parallel yield curve shifts.  Cash flow simulation also has the
advantage of providing other information likely to be useful to regulators, such as the predicted time to
failure, that is not provided by any of the existing regulatory information systems.  
References
Altman, Edward I., 1992, "Revisiting The High Yield Bond Market," Financial Management 21: 78-92.
A.M. Best Company, 1996, Best’s Aggregates and Averages: 1996 Edition (Oldwick, NJ).
A.M. Best Company, 1990, Best's Insolvency Study: Property/Casualty Insurers 1969-1990 (Oldwick, NJ).
Casualty Actuarial Society, 1996, Proceedings of the Casualty Actuarial Society Forum (Landover, MD,
Spring 1996).  
Cummins, J.D., S. Harrington, and R. Klein, 1995, “Insolvency Experience, Risk-Based Capital, and Prompt
Corrective Action in Property-Liability Insurance,” Journal of Banking and Finance 19: 511-527.
Cummins, J.D., S. Harrington, and G. Niehaus, 1993, “An Economic Overview of Risk-based Capital
Requirements in the Property-liability Insurance Industry,” Journal of Insurance Regulation 11: 427-
447.
Cummins, J.D., S. Harrington, and G. Niehaus, 1995, “Risk-Based Capital Requirements for Property-
liability Insurers: A Financial Analysis,” in Edward Altman and Irwin Vanderhoof, eds., The
Financial Dynamics  of the Insurance Industry (Homewood, IL: Irwin Professional Publishers). 
Cummins, J.D. and R.D. Phillips, 1994, “Cash Flow Simulation Model User’s Guide,” working paper,
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
Grace, M., S. Harrington, and R. Klein, 1995, An Analysis of the FAST Solvency Monitoring System,
presented to the NAIC’s Financial Analysis Working Group. (Kansas City: NAIC).
Grace, M.F., S. Harrington, and R. Klein, 1998, “Risk-Based Capital and Solvency Screening In Property-
Liability Insurance: Hypotheses and Empirical Tests,” Journal of Risk and Insurance 65: 213-243.
Greene, William H., 1990, Econometric Analysis (New York, Macmillan).
Hodes, D.M., T. Neghaiwi, J. D. Cummins, R.D. Phillips, and S. Feldblum, 1996, “The Financial Modeling
of Property/Casualty Insurance Companies,” in Proceedings of the Casualty Actuarial Society Forum
(Ladover, MD: Casualty Actuarial Society, 1996). 
Ibbotson Associates, 1993, Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation: 1993 Yearbook (Chicago).
Klein, R.W., 1995, “Insurance Regulation in Transition,’ Journal of Risk and Insurance 62: 363-404.
Lamm-Tennant, J., and Starks, L., 1993, “Stock Versus Mutual Ownership Structures: The Risk
Implications,”  Journal of Business 66: 29-46.
Metz C.E., Wang P.L., Kronman H.B., 1984, “A New Approach for Testing the Significance of Difference
Between ROC Curves Measured from Correlated Data,” in F. Deconinck, ed., Information Processing
in Medical Imaging: Proceedings of the 8
th Conference (Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff), pp. 432-445.
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 1993, “NAIC Property/Casualty Risk-based Capital
Formula Exposure Draft” (Kansas City, MO).
Petersen, W. W., T. G. Birdsall, and W. C. Fox, 1954, “IRE Transactions of the Professional Group on
Information Theory,” PGIT-4, 171.
Pregibon, D., 1981, “Logistic Regression Diagnostics,” Annals of Statistics 9: 705-724.
Swets, J. A., 1996, Signal Detection Theory in Psychology and Diagnostics: Collected Papers (Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates: Mahwah, NJ).
United States, U.S. General Accounting Office, 1991, “Insurance Regulation: State Handling of Troubled
Property/Casualty Insurers (Washington, D.C.).
United States, U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the
Committee on Energy and Commerce, 1990, Failed Promises–Insurance Company Insolvencies.
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office).
Appendix A
Cash Flow Scenario Definitions
Underwriting Risk
Underwriting risk is defined as the risk that the loss ratio on new business will be higher than expected.  The
loss ratio applies to the eighteen months of new business assumed to be written by the company after the
closing date of the annual statement being analyzed.  The baseline scenario sets the expected loss ratio for
each line of business equal to 0.5 times the company’s average loss ratio for the five years ending in the
current statement year and 0.5 times the industry loss ratio during the same time period.  The moderately and
severely adverse scenarios assume that the expected loss ratio is equal to the baseline ratio plus one-half and
one standard deviation, respectively.  The standard deviation for a line of business is calculated over the same
five-year period and is the weighted average of the company’s and industry’s standard deviations using
weights of 0.5. The model could be used with credibility weights that vary by company, with large companies
giving a higher weighting to their own loss ratio than smaller companies.  The use of weights of 0.5 on
company and industry experience again goes along with our strategy of testing the model with minimal
operator intervention in order to provide a strong test of the accuracy of cash flow simulation. Experimenting
with different weights for underwriting risk and more company-specific values for other parameters would
be likely to yield to more accurate results with the cash flow model.  
Reserving Risk
Reserving risk is the risk that the loss reserves are less than the payments that eventually will be necessary
to satisfy the loss obligations of the company.  The baseline scenario assumes the company’s reserves are
understated by a percentage equal to the weighted average of the company’s adverse loss development
percentage and the industry’s adverse loss development percentage using data available from the annual
statement, Schedule P - Part 2. (The weights are equal to 0.5.) If the company or industry overreserved during
the time period, the relevant adverse reserve development percentages are set equal to zero.  The moderate
and severely adverse scenarios assume the company’s loss reserves have been understated by the company’s
and industry’s weighted average adverse development plus one and two loss development standard
deviations, respectively.  
Market Risk
Market risk is the risk that the company’s equity portfolio will experience capital losses during the simulation
period. The portfolio is stressed two ways.  First, the simulation assumes that the company suffers a capital
loss during the first year of analysis and then realizes capital gains in subsequent years equal to the long-term
(1926-1992) historical average capital gains rate as reported by Ibottson Associates (1993).  The baseline
scenario assumes the first year capital gains rate is equal to the historical average.  The moderate and severely
adverse scenarios assume the first year capital gains rate is equal to the historical average minus one and two
standard deviations, respectively. The standard deviations are the long-term (1926-1992) historical standard
deviations on large company stocks reported in Ibbotson Associates (1993).
The second way adverse experience is introduced is by modifying the dividend yield rate for the first year and
then returning the rate to the historical average level for subsequent years. The baseline scenario sets the first
year dividend yield rate equal to the long-term historical average.  The moderate and severely adverse
scenarios assume the year one rate is equal to the historical average minus one and two standard deviations,
respectively.  Again, these statistics are for large company stocks over the period 1926-1992 (Ibbotson
Associates, 1993).
Bond Default 
Bond default risk arises as bond issuers may default on principal and interest payments on outstanding issues.
For each NAIC bond category 1-6, the baseline scenario reduces the outstanding principal of the bond by the
average bond mortality experience as reported by Edward Altman (1992).  The moderate and severely adverse
scenarios incorporate bond mortality loss rates equal to Altman’s averages plus one and two standard
deviations, respectively, computed from data in Altman (1992).
Credit Risk
Credit risk is the risk that the company will not be able to collect on the full amount of receivables owed to
the company by agents and reinsurers. The baseline scenario assumes the insurer will be unable to collect 1
percent of its accrued retrospective premiums and agents’ balances and 4 percent of its reinsurance
recoverables. The moderate and severely adverse scenarios assume these percentages will be 2 and 5 percent
for the accrued retrospective premiums and agents’ balances, and 5 and 10 percent for the reinsurance
recoverables, respectively.  The credit risk scenarios are judgmental as historical information regarding the
credit risk of insurers is not publicly available.  
Interest Rate Risk
We incorporate interest rate risk in the cash flow model in two ways.  First, a credit spread is included in the
interest rates used to estimate the market value of bond portfolio for the insurer. The credit spread is
judgmentally set at 100 basis points for each NAIC bond rating category, i.e., NAIC category 1 bonds were
given yield rates equal to the Treasury bond rate for the appropriate maturity; category 2 bonds were given
yield rates equal to the Treasury rate plus 100 basis points, etc. Second, we assume the risk-free rate of
interest moves upward during the first two years of analysis: 100 basis points after the first year and an
additional 300 basis points after the second year.  The risk-free rate for years three through 20 remains 400
basis points above the year one rate.  The cash flow model includes seven different interest scenarios which
are defined in Appendix Table A.1. The credit spread and interest rate scenarios were selected judgmentally
by the authors of the cash flow model (J. David Cummins, Richard D. Phillips, Douglas Hodes, and Sholom
Feldblum) based on financial principles as well as experience of Hodes and Feldblum with dynamic financial
analysis models used by insurers and actuarial consultants.
Table A.1
Economic Scenarios Used in the Cash Flow Simulations
Assumptions
Scenario  Underwriting Reserve Stock Market Bond Default Credit Risk Interest Rate
1 Baseline Baseline Moderate Moderate Moderate Rf Year 1=.01, Year 2=0.02, Years 3-20=0.05
2 Moderate Moderate Severe Severe Severe Rf Year 1=.02, Year 2=0.03, Years 3-20=0.06
3 Severe Severe Severe Severe Severe Rf Year 1=.03, Year 2=0.04, Years 3-20=0.07
4 Severe Moderate Moderate Severe Moderate Rf Year 1=.04, Year 2=0.05, Years 3-20=0.08
5 Severe Moderate Severe Moderate Moderate Rf Year 1=.05, Year 2=0.06, Years 3-20=0.09
6 Severe Baseline Severe Severe Moderate Rf Year 1=.05, Year 2=0.06, Years 3-20=0.09
7 Baseline Severe Severe Moderate Severe Rf Year 1=.07, Year 2=0.08, Years 3-20=0.11     
1We used a program called CORROC2 written by Dr. Charles Metz at the University of Chicago School
of Medicine to conduct the maximum likelihood estimation.  The software can be downloaded via
anonymous FTP by accessing ftp://random.bsd.uchicago.edu. 
     
2That is, the variable X, for example, arises from one of two normal probability densities, f(x*n) or f(x*s),
where n stands for “noise only” and s for “signal present.”  In terms of our analysis, “noise only” can be
taken to refer to solvent firms and “signal present” to refer to insolvent firms.
     
3In our analysis we chose to employ 11 response categories based on cutoffs at 0.025, 0.05, 0.10, 0.20,
0.30, 0.40., 0.50, 0.60, 0.70, 0.80.  Metz, Wang, and Kronman (1984) suggest using as many cutoffs as
possible to provide the most information about the distribution of predictions. Eleven was the maximum
number of different response categories allowable under the CORROC2 program.  In addition, they suggest
using more finely aggregated cutoffs where large numbers of observations are found.  Given the large number
of solvent companies in our sample relative to the number of insolvents, we choose to create a larger number
of response categories at the lower probabilities of predicted insolvency than at the higher probabilities.  

Appendix B
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Analysis
The goal of receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis is to provide a statistical test of whether a given
model outperforms an alternative model in a binary prediction exercise (i.e., in categorizing observations
into two mutually exclusive groups) for various Type II error rates. ROC analysis is usually summarized
graphically by plotting a ROC curve in a two dimensional plane where the Type II error rate is plotted along
the X-axis and the complement of the Type I error rate (1 minus the Type I error rate) is plotted along the
Y-axis.  In the standard analysis, the curve is assumed to have the same functional form as that implied by
two normal distributions.  This assumption has the convenient property that ROC curves plotted on normal
deviate axes are transformed into straight lines.  Thus, determining the slope, b, and y-intercept, a, of a
transformed ROC curve will completely describe the relative difference between the parameters of the two
underlying normal distributions. 
In our analysis, we assume that two alternative models, X and Y, will yield unique ROC curves.  The goal
is to estimate the parameters a and b for each model.  To accomplish this we adopt the maximum likelihood
technique developed by Metz, Wang, and Kronman (1984).
1  Formally, let there be two decision variables,
X and Y, that arise from two bivariate normal joint probability distributions.
2  For our purposes we want to
compare the predictive ability of two different logistic regression models, X and Y. For a given base-year,
each model produces a probability of insolvency for each insurer in our sample.  Define f(x,y|insolvent) to
be the joint probability density function of insolvency for a firm that eventually becomes insolvent over the
three year prediction horizon, and f(x,y |solvent) to be the joint probability density function for a firm that
remains solvent. Next, define a set of cutoffs ti and uj such that 
(i) if x < t1, then the response is I=1; y < u1, then the response is j=1
(ii) if x > tn the response is I=n+1; y > un the response is j=n+1; and
(iii) if ti < x < ti+1 the response is I for all I < n; ui < y < ui+1 the response is j for all j < n;
3 
where x and y represent the fitted values x
f and y
f, respectively, from two estimated logistic models
following the general specification of equation (10).       
4Without loss of generality, the mean of the joint “signal present” distribution of X and Y is set to (0,0)
and the marginal standard deviations of this distribution are set equal to 1.  The transformations of ti and ui
in equation (A.4) then convert the “noise only” variates to standard normal variates.  Before the
transformations, the marginal distributions of these variates had means (ax/bx) and (ay/by), respectively, and
and standard deviations (1/bx) and (1/by).  Thus, as explained above, the a parameters represent the
differences between the means of the marginal “signal present” and “noise only” distributions.
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ij log ij (A.5)
Thus, for each insolvent observation in the sample, the probability of a pair of ratings, I and j, from each
competing model will equal 
where 
and 
where F(x,y,r) = a bivariate standard normal probability distribution function and f(x,y,r)= a bivariate
standard normal density function, both evaluated at x and y with correlation coefficient r; and rins is the
correlation coefficient of the probability of insolvency between two models for the sample of insolvent
companies.  
Similarly, for each solvent firm in the sample, the probability of a pair of ratings I and j from the two models
will equal
ij ' F(bxti&ax,byuj&ay,rsol) % F(bxti&1&ax,byuj&1&ay,rsol)
& F(bxti&1&ax,byuj&ay,rsol) & F(bxti&ax,byuj&1&ay,rsol)
(A.4)
where rsol is the correlation coefficient of the probability of insolvency between two models for the sample
of solvent companies.
4  Given these definitions, the likelihood function to be maximized with respect to ax,

















sol)is the number of insolvent (solvent) observations to have the pair of ratings from the two
models equal to I and j.
Once the parameters of the ROC curves have been estimated, a useful statistic that summarizes the accuracy
of a particular model involves calculating the area below the ROC curve.  This statistic, known as the area
index, is denoted Az where the subscript represents the particular model (i.e., X or Y) being summarized.
The area index is related to the estimated parameters of the ROC curve for a particular model Z by the
expression
where  (•) is the commutative normal distribution function.  A model that perfectly discriminates between
the insolvent and solvent companies will have an area index equal to 1.0 and a model with no discriminatory
power will result in an area index of 0.50.  Using the results of the maximum likelihood estimation, we test
the null hypothesis of equal areas under the two estimated ROC by calculating
where SEi
2 is the standard error for Ai and r is the correlation coefficient between Ax and Ay, and the statistic
z is distributed as a standard normal variate.  The null hypothesis is rejected for large values of the test
statistic z.